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Introduction 
The corruption perception index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International (TI) ranks countries by 
perceived levels of corruption.1 The CPI is central to the work of the non-governmental organisation 
(NGO). When it was first published in 1995, the CPI was the first non-commercial global corruption 
ranking. The NGO used the index to promote its cause, gain attention, and hold states to account. 
The CPI is a composite index that aggregates the results of other rankings. The index has proven 
highly effective as a public relations tool but its methodology has come under critical scrutiny.2 The 
CPI is an expression of reformist ‘statactivism’3 and a reformist benchmark4 that governs corruption 
‘at a distance’5 by ‘responsibilising’ states.6 In this article I explain how and why the CPI underplays 
the responsibility of corporations in corruption. In the process, I develop a Gramscian analytical 
framework for looking at the politics of benchmarking, which has wider relevance beyond the 
particular case of the CPI.  
 
 
I rely on the analytical framework by Rose and Miller to explain how corporate bias seeps into the 
CPI:7 how a neoliberal rationality is translated into a programme to govern corruption and then a 
technology – the benchmark that is the CPI. A comprehensive survey of sources used to compile 
Transparency International’s (TI) corruption perception index (CPI) 2001-2016 shows that the vast 
majority were either produced for sale to corporate clients or were based on surveys of business 
elites. Both of these types of sources primarily reflect the corruption concerns of business. 
Importantly, the history of the methodology shows that this bias remained unmentioned from 1997 
until 2011. This made it appear more ‘radical’ than it was. Secondly, I explain why TI has a corporate 
bias by embedding the index’s production into a wider Gramscian political economy: TI workers are 
Gramscian intellectuals who put forward an interpretation of corruption that is non-threatening to 
corporate capital. They are not necessarily ‘organic intellectuals’ but better understood as what 
Eagleton-Pierce had called ‘critical technicians’ who deploy ‘scientific capital’ in a political economy 
of competition with other civil society organisations, including more radical ones.8 The reformist 
nature of TI’s work, as well as the CPI’s corporate bias have been widely noted.9 In a case study of 
the CPI and Tunisia, Baumann also suggested that the production of the CPI should be embedded in 
a wider political economy but stopped short of conducting such an analysis.10 This article is thus the 
first sustained attempt to do so systematically. As benchmarks become an increasingly important 
means of governing the global political economy ‘at a distance’, I therefore make the case for 
Gramscian interpretation of their role in either reproducing or challenging hegemonic ideology. 
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To be clear, I am not claiming that TI wilfully distorts the CPI. The influence of methodology is much 
more subtle. The article should also not be read as a denunciation of TI’s work as a whole.11 As the 
politics of benchmarking receives greater attention in the international relations literature, analyses 
that focus on the politics of benchmarks alone, rather than assessing all aspects of the work of the 
organisation that compiles it, is becoming more common.12 The first section of this article looks at 
ways of theorising benchmarks in general and the CPI in particular, the second section sets out the 
empirical analysis of CPI sources 2001-2016, a third section looks at the political economy of 
producing the CPI, and a final section concludes. 
 
 
Theorising the corruption perception index 
 
The corruption perception index is a governance indicator that ranks countries by their perceived 
level of corruption. It is a benchmark, where ‘benchmarking involves the classification of relative 
performance or value’ and ‘is used as an umbrella term for a wide range of comparative evaluation 
techniques – such as audits, rankings, indicators, indexes, baselines, or targets – which 
systematically assess the performance of actors, populations, or institutions on the basis of 
standardised measurements, metrics, and rankings.’13 The explosion in the number of governance 
indicators and other benchmarks has raised academic interest in the ‘politics of numbers’ as an 
aspect of global governance.14 The CPI is an important measure because of its media exposure and 
its influence on policy making in both donor countries and developing economies. The methodology 
of the CPI has come under extensive criticism.15 One recurring aspect of this critique is that the 
sources of this composite index give far greater weight to forms of corruption that concern large 
corporations than alternative forms that concern ordinary citizens.16 One contribution of this article 
is to document how this comes about by analysing the CPI sources 2001-2016. Producers of 
benchmarks such as the CPI claim objective and impartial social scientific expertise but the 
compilation of the indicator is not value neutral, it reflects a wider theory of the ‘good society’,17 and 
the inclusion of ‘dodgy data’ or practices of ‘bad science’ have consequences for global 
governance.18 A second puzzle is the obfuscation of this bias. When the CPI was first published by TI 
in 1995 the organisation acknowledged that the index reflected mostly a business perspective.19 By 
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1997 the range of sources had been expanded and TI wrote in the press release that the index ‘is 
based on seven international surveys of business people, political analysts and the general public 
and it reflects their perception of corruption in 52 countries’.20 Only in 2012 did the CPI’s ‘frequently 
asked questions’ section return to acknowledging that the index does not ‘tell the full story of 
corruption in a country’ because the ‘CPI is limited in scope, capturing perceptions of the extent of 
corruption in the public sector, from the perspective of business people and country experts.’21 As 
my analysis of CPI sources 2001-2016 will show, the preponderance of sources reflecting corporate 
concerns over corruption persisted throughout. 
 
 
My critique of the CPI adopts what Desrosières had referred to as a ‘constructionist’ attitude to 
measurement, where measurement shapes the object.22 Measurement is shaped by context: 
‘Statistical production results from power relationships. It is ideological’.23 This stands in contrast to 
most previous critiques of TI’s methodology which tended to adopt an attitude of what Desrosières 
had called ‘accounting realism’ by asking how TI could tweak its measurement methodology to 
better depict reality. TI itself often defends the CPI methodology using a ‘proof in use’ attitude by 
arguing that, while imperfect, corruption perception is the best means of measuring illicit 
corruption, which, by definition, is difficult to capture.24 Desrosières was sceptical of ‘constructionist’ 
critiques which could slip into ‘the language of denunciation’ and over-emphasise the ‘external’ 
aspect of the production of statistics – the wider social context – over the ‘internal’ history of 
measurement – the statistical conventions employed by those who measure.25 This articles 
highlights how ‘external’ factors, especially the cost associated with the ‘work’ of measuring, 
introduced corporate bias into the CPI, but it also pays close attention to the ‘internal’ workings of 
the CPI methodology.26  
 
 
For Foucault ‘government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient 
end.’27 Abstract ‘things’ such as the economy or a population are ‘governed’. The objects to be 
governed do not simply exist but are constructed in the very process of government. They need to 
be made visible, and one way of doing so is to measure a phenomenon. When TI measures 
corruption, it makes it visible. Liberal IR remains state-centric in its conception of the way liberal 
norms and institutions are created while welcoming global civil society’s check on state power, and 
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its civilising influence on the public sphere.28 Liberal international relations theory regards the CPI as 
a means for global civil society to hold corrupt states to account.29 TI conceives of the CPI in this 
liberal vein. Foucault, in contrast, finds that social science research attaches ‘excessive value’ to the 
state. What matters to him is the state’s role in ‘government’ rather than the myth of the state as 
the sole centre of power.30 Civil society is no adversary to keep the state in check, nor is it 
necessarily separate or subordinate to the state. It shares a role in ‘government’, thus breaking 
down the state-civil society binary.31 Global governance indices are a way for global civil society 
organisations to contribute to global ‘government’. The indices do not exert ‘hard power’ by 
punishing errant behaviour but focus on the ‘self-optimisation of subjects through individual liberty 
and freedom of choice.’32 This goes beyond the outside ‘social pressure’33 that liberal IR assumes is 
exerted through these indexes. Foucauldian governmentality makes the stronger claim that states 
internalise the logic of the index and act on it. Benchmarking and ‘responsibilisation’ produce ‘the 
examined state as an ethical subject responsible for what occurs within its borders.’34 Jaeger points 
to the de-politicising effect this has. Individuals become ‘partners’ in solving intractable problems of 
government rather than being treated as political subjects, for instance partisans of a political 
cause.35 Governance indicators ‘normalise’ neoliberal government.36 States and civil society are both 
implicated in the exercise of Foucauldian governmentality.  
 
 
I will trace how corporate bias entered the CPI by applying Rose and Miller’s Foucauldian analytical 
framework for ‘governing at a distance’.37 At the most abstract level governmentality works by 
formulating a ‘rationality of government’ such as liberalism or neoliberalism.38 Experts then apply 
these rationalities to specific problems, formulating ‘programmes of government’. Formulating a 
programme involves claims of knowledge about the issue, whether it is the economy, nature, health 
– or indeed corruption. Technologies of government operate at the most practical level. They are 
‘humble and mundane mechanisms’ by which programmes are translated into social reality: surveys, 
techniques of notation and computation, statistics, standardization, specialist vocabularies, building 
designs etc. ‘Techniques’ of government make a problem visible for it to then be governed. In a final 
step, states ‘self-govern’, which means that they internalise the logic of the indicator and act 
accordingly.39  
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I follow Garland  who argues that ‘it becomes essential to explore the real practices and processes in 
which these programmes and rationalities and technologies are selectively and sometimes 
unexpectedly used, with all of their compromise formations and unintended effects.’40 How is 
neoliberal rationality translated into a programme to govern corruption? This means that any 
analysis of the ‘governmental’ work of governance indexes such as the CPI must take methodologies 
into account. Methodologies are not merely technicalities and the point is not to achieve perfect 
measurement, but an understanding of the process of translation from rationality to programme to 
technology of government. My work builds on recent efforts by authors such as Baumann; Broome 
and Quirk; Broome, Homolar and Kranke; as well as Davis, Kingsbury and Merry who have started 
including the methodologies of governance indexes in the analysis of ‘governing at a distance.’41 In 
the past, several Foucauldian theorists consciously eschewed any analysis of the methodology of 
governance indicators.42 This was probably out of fear that the discussion would move to 
technicalities of how to measure better, rather than the politics of measuring per-se. With regard to 
the CPI, this neglect of methodology misses the corporate bias which is potentially central to the 
index’s function in global governance. Loewenheim notes correctly that the CPI involves a blame 
game, ‘responsibilising’ the examined state.43 Global corporations are not exactly let off the hook, 
but in the gaze of the CPI they appear marginal to corruption.  
 
 
Foucauldian analysis tells us how the corporate bias comes about. My survey of CPI sources 2001-
2016 is the first one to document this process. The more novel contribution of this article, however 
is to ask why the bias comes about by embedding the production of the CPI in a Marxist – or more 
specifically a Gramscian – political economy. Marxist critics of Foucault argue that he evaded 
political economy by focusing on the diffusion of ‘capillary power’ across society. They detect a 
deliberate exclusion of the macro-social structures at the heart of Marxian analysis, namely classes, 
mode of production, and the state.44 Poulantzas  found that Foucault ‘tends to blot out power by 
dispersing it among tiny molecular vessels.’45 He argued that Foucault’s ideas were useful only if (re-
)grounded in a wider analysis of the political economy of capitalism and the institutions that arise 
from it.46 Similarly, Jessop and Sum find that ‘Foucault can tell us something about the how of power 
but far less about the why of power and its role in reproducing particular forms of social 
domination.’47 They contrast Foucault’s diffuse account of power with Gramsci’s, who grounds 
power in specific political and ideological and economic apparatuses. Selby transposes these 
arguments about the complementarity of Marx and Foucault to international relations, echoing 
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Jessop and Sum’s suggestion to use Foucault to study the ‘how’ of power and Marx for the ‘why’.48 
This is what I am doing with regard to the CPI: Rose and Miller’s Foucauldian analysis reveals how 
corporate bias seeps in, while Gramsci can tell us why: The TI workers who produce the CPI are 
Gramscian ‘intellectuals’ who operate in the force field of the neoliberal global political economy. 
 
 
Gramscian IR relates social relations of production, forms of state, and world orders.49 The important 
difference between Foucauldian and Gramscian approaches is that, while the latter share the 
former’s concern for civil society and ideas, they ground all practices and discourses in a wider story 
of social relations of production – in other words, class. Gramsci found that revolution involved not 
just a struggle for the state but for ideological hegemony, the ‘common sense’ that either 
reproduces or challenges the prevailing social order. Civil society is the terrain on which this ‘war of 
position’ is being fought. For the Italian Marxist intellectuals provide coherence to both dominant 
group and – potentially – subalterns and shape ‘common sense’ in a ‘war of position’ which is fought 
on the terrain of civil society. 50 He wrote that ‘the intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies” 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government’.51 This notion of the 
‘deputy’ is rather nebulous and can take many forms and we will return to this notion in the 
discussion of the findings.  
 
 
A judgement whether the CPI reproduces or challenges the ideological hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism is the starting point for a Gramscian analysis. Bruno, Didier, and Vitale had distinguished 
between ‘reformist’ and ‘radical’ statactivism. For instance, they give the example of an alternative 
inflation measure as ‘reformist’ because ‘it […] adopted the architecture of economic concepts that 
make such an index pertinent’, which a ‘radical’ critique would call into question. 52  This is echoed by 
Seabrooke and Wigan who distinguish between benchmarks which ‘create change within the 
dominant system’ as opposed to those which ‘seek to challenge how the basic units of the system, 
and the logic of the system, is perceived.’53 They argue that the CPI is very much ‘reformist’ because 
‘the index fails to capture the supply side of corruption and the culpability of the private sector.’54 
They contrast the CPI with the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI) of the Tax Justice Network (TJN) which 
ranks jurisdictions by the degree of financial secrecy and weight in the global economy. Where the 
former puts the onus on public officials, the latter regards the issue of financial transparency as 
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systemic. The FSI flips the CPI on its head: Where the latter chastises developing countries for their 
high levels of public sector corruption, the former fingers leading industrialised nations for their role 
in tax secrecy. Countries that do well in the ‘reformist’ CPI do badly in the more ‘radical’ FSI.55 The 
FSI is thus much more disruptive of existing social relations that govern corruption than the CPI. Rose 
and Miller’s Foucauldian account tells us how corporate bias creeps into the CPI but tells us less 
about the why. In Gramscian terms, the corporate bias in the CPI reproduces rather than challenges 
the hegemonic ideology underpinning neoliberal capitalism. TI workers who translate a neoliberal 
‘rationality’ into a ‘programme’ to govern corruption and subsequently deploy the CPI as a 
‘technology’ can be understood as Gramscian intellectuals.  
 
 
TI’s methodology 
Corruption is an ‘essentially contested concept’. It is strongly normative, multidimensional, and its 
meaning changes over time.56 It has been related to legality, cultural norms, or the moral health of 
society at large.57 Analysing ‘narratives’ of corruption enables ‘a rich analysis of ideology, hegemony 
and legitimacy’.58 Benchmarks such as the CPI contain a corruption narrative, too, dividing states into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, corrupt and clean. Herein lies the hidden ideological power of indicators measuring 
corruption: Simplification, quantification, and evaluation are not impartial and objective scientific 
processes but are based on a theory of the ‘good society’ and they ‘cannot be separated from 
political values and policy reform preferences’.59 Measures ‘alter relations of power by affecting how 
resources, status, knowledge and opportunities are distributed’.60 As I argue here, we can 
understand indicators and benchmarks as weapons in a war of position over common sense and 
those who produce them as intellectuals in civil society, the terrain of this struggle.  
 
 
The Transparency International ‘Sourcebook’, written by then-managing director Jeremy Pope in 
1996 and updated in 2000 translates a neoliberal ‘rationality’ into a ‘programme’ to govern 
corruption, as Hindess explains.61 Although the Sourcebook is now rarely cited by TI, it illustrates the 
thinking that guided the NGO’s work at the time the CPI was developed. The Sourcebook’s 
paradigms remain embedded in the index’s methodology.62 I follow Hindess’ analysis which showed 
that Pope’s Sourcebook had the effect of ‘normalising’ neoliberalism.63 Hindess ties this into a wider 
critique of TI’s non-confrontational approach with both bribe-payers and -takers in favour of what 
9 
 
the NGO calls National Integrity Systems (NIS) in which private sector, state, and civil society all 
come together in a coalition against corruption.64 The Sourcebook subscribes to a ‘clean’ capitalism 
free of corruption: ‘Corruption strikes at the heart of the market economy, distorting decision-
making, and rewarding the corrupt and manipulative rather than the efficient and the productive.’65 
Corruption is bad because it is economically inefficient. The effect of corruption on private sector 
development in general and foreign investment in particular is a priority concern for Pope. 
Corruption introduces uncertainty and takes up valuable time that business leaders could use to run 
more efficient companies. The Sourcebook focuses exclusively on bribes at the expense of other 
forms of corruption, using the terms bribes and corruption almost interchangeably.66 It focuses on 
bribe takers in the public sector and has little to say about bribe payers in the private sector. The 
Sourcebook argues that the analysis of corruption – meaning bribes to the public sector – has to 
start from incentives of individual public sector officials.67 Bureaucrats are framed as perpetrators, 
private businesses as extorted victims. Transparency International seeks to fulfil the role of liberal 
global civil society of holding states to account, in this case curbing state corruption. TI stresses that 
corruption is serious in developed countries but at crisis point in developing states.68 Pope’s 
conception of corruption chimes with a neoliberal analysis of the phenomenon. The source of 
corruption is excessive state intervention in the workings of the market, leading to ‘rent-seeking’.69 
The anti-corruption fight must therefore focus on the incentive structure that pushes bureaucrats 
into becoming corrupters.70 Alternative accounts of corruption contextualise the causes and the 
effects of corruption, focusing on state-business relations rather than just state intervention, 
including compatibility of rapid growth with some types of corruption.71 The Sourcebook also speaks 
to a Foucauldian conception of neoliberalism, as Hindess notes, in that it offers a ‘programme of 
government’ to ‘normalise’ neoliberalism.72 
 
 
Step two in the analysis traces the translation from a programme to a technology of government, 
from the conception of corruption in Pope’s Sourcebook to the measurement of corruption in the 
CPI. Transparency International currently defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.’73 When it comes to the CPI. TI focuses exclusively on public sector corruption, 
mirroring the Sourcebook’s focus on public administration as the source of corruption. TI stresses 
that the CPI is not its only measure of corruption. Its bribe payers’ index, for instance, maps the 
‘supply side’ of corruption rather than the public sector recipients of graft.74 However, the CPI 
remains its flagship publication and the ideological stance on ‘clean’ capitalism remains embedded in 
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the index’s methodology. This is a case of what Broome, Homolar, and Kanke had called ‘paradigm 
maintenance by other means’, where benchmarking practices continue neoliberal normalisation 
even after institutions move away from this ideology in other parts of their work.75  
 
 
The CPI is a composite index.76 TI does not conduct its own surveys but aggregates the results of 
corruption rankings published by other organisations. Data sources must be from credible 
institutions that regularly produce indices, the sources must quantify corruption in the public sector, 
they must have a valid and reliable methodology, and allow for sufficient variation in scores to 
distinguish between countries. TI then standardises the data sources so they score all countries on a 
scale from 0 to 100, from low to high corruption.77 A country must be covered by at least three 
sources to be included in the ranking. TI then calculates the average of the scores that sources 
provide for a country. TI also reports a standard error and confidence interval as measures of 
uncertainty. The CPI aggregates existing sources. It is these sources which narrate the CPI’s 
corruption story. One of the advantages often cited in favour of composite indexes is that they 
aggregate a wide variety of perspectives and definitions on corruption and hence capture the 
phenomenon in great breadth, including multiple definitions of the phenomenon and the corruption 
concerns of multiple social groups.78 This breadth leads to greater reliability than possibly flawed 
individual sources.79 TI makes this claim itself. In the press release for the first CPI in 1995, then-
chairman of TI Peter Eigen acknowledged that the index was based on polls of business interests and 
financial journalists and said: ‘It is thus a picture of how international business sees the levels of 
corruption.’80 However, by 1997 the CPI press release claimed explicitly that the inclusion of a public 
opinion survey made ‘the index less biased against developing countries than in the first two years 
when the index was solely based on the perceptions of foreign business people, most of them from 
Western industrialised countries.’81 TI thus denied corporate bias. Only in 2012 did the CPI’s 
‘frequently asked questions’ section again acknowledge that the CPI captures ‘the perspective of 
business people and country experts.’ 
 
 
A closer look at CPI sources reveals that most reflect a business perspective at the expense of 
alternative concerns over corruption that affects ordinary citizens. This is not to say that business 
concerns over bribery risk are illegitimate. It is also not possible to determine the ‘correct’ balance 
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between different perspectives on corruption. Corporate concerns over corruption relate to the risk 
of having to pay bribes, cronyism preventing market entry, as well as market inefficiencies that arise 
in deeply corrupt polities. There is no one single unified business perspective on corruption but 
overall business does share a set of concerns that revolve around the risk of having to pay a bribe. If 
the CPI gives greater weight to sources that reflect business concerns, other forms of corruption 
receive less attention. The range of the phenomenon that is being captured becomes narrower 
without consumers of the index being fully aware of it. 
 
 
Sources used in the CPI apply varying definitions of corruption. These matter for our purposes: Do 
they address the corruption concerns of large corporations over the risk of bribery or do they 
embrace a wider view? It is difficult to coherently code these definitions used in CPI sources but 
several features stand out.82 Some definitions include accountability, transparency, and 
effectiveness of government anti-corruption action. Some sources use a very general definition of 
corruption. However, the most widely used definition in CPI sources concerns bribery and the costs 
of bribe-paying to doing business, whether with regards to permits, licenses, or public procurement. 
TI’s sources do indeed cover a wide variety of corruption definitions, but what is striking is the 
preponderance of corruption definitions which concern large multinational corporations – namely 
the risk of paying bribes. Other perspectives are by no means excluded, but the dominance of 
business concerns is evident.  
 
The sources that are aggregated into the CPI do the job of narrating the index’s corruption story. My 
analysis suggests that the majority of sources that flowed into the CPI 2001 to 2016 were aimed at 
paying customers in the corporate world. They would therefore have reflected the corruption 
concerns of this customer base. In order to code the sources that TI uses, I applied Broome and 
Quirk’s typology of benchmarks produced by either:83  
• national government agencies,  
• international organisations and regional institutions,  
• profit-based institutions, including financial services and consultancy firms,  
• civil society organisations, think tanks, media organisations, and academics.  
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I use this classification to code the sources that TI was using to put together the CPI between 2001 
and 2016, the years for which the NGO makes the data available on their website.84 Sources from 
for-profit consulting companies are likely to reflect the corruption concerns of their corporate 
clients. 9 sources were international organisations, 9 were for-profit consulting companies, and 11 
were civil society or media organisations from 2001 to 2016. The CPI did not include rankings by 
national governments. However, not all sources were used each year. Furthermore, most sources 
only cover a limited number of countries and not all countries covered by a source are also taken 
into account by TI to calculate the CPI score. TI requires input from at least three sources to include a 
country in the CPI, excluding countries that are covered by only two sources or fewer. Furthermore, 
TI was relying on two types of surveys: of business elites, or country experts. Whenever TI was using 
sources based on surveys of business elites, it would include either the previous three (for the CPI 
2001 to 2005) or two years (for the CPI 2006 to 2011) to even out year-on-year fluctuations on such 
surveys.85 This also meant that from 2001 to 2011, business surveys carried greater weight. From 
2012 onwards, TI only counted one year of each source. 
 
I added up the number of times a source was used for an individual country analysis. For instance, in 
2009 Argentina was covered by seven sources, three of which were produced by civil society 
organisations and four by for-profit consultancies. Of the surveys TI referenced between 2001 and 
2016, international organisation reports were used for 1,819 country assessments, civil society 
organisation reports went into 6,412 country assessments, and for-profit consultancies influenced 
8,362 country assessments. Of all the times that sources were taken into account for a country 
assessment from 2001 to 2016, 50.4 percent came from for-profit consultancies, while 38.6 percent 
came from civil society organisations and 11.0 percent from international organisations. The for-
profit reports are predominantly aimed at large corporations. The producers of these reports must 
therefore speak to their corruption concerns. From 51.1 percent in 2001 to 48.1 percent in 2015, for-
profit reports were the single most influential type of sources for country assessments (see figure 1). 
Only in 2016 did civil society organisations (45.5 percent) have a slight edge over for-profit 
consultancies (45.5 percent). 
 
Large corporations are not only the consumers of reports from for-profit providers, their views also 
shape the surveys from non-profit providers.  Several international organisation and civil society 
organisations were using business surveys as the basis for their rankings. These were used 3,764 
times for country assessments between 2001 and 2016. This means that for 73.1 percent of times a 
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source was used for a CPI country assessment 2001 to 2016, the source was either produced for sale 
to corporate customers or reflected the perceptions of business people who had been surveyed. The 
most prominent business survey used in the CPI is the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) executive 
opinion survey. The WEF is funded by hundreds of corporate members and blurs the line between 
civil society and business lobby. In their 2012 assessment of CPI methodology, Saisana and Saltelli 
note that the WEF has a great effect on the ranking. They ran tests excluding each individual source 
in turn to see how this affects the overall result of the CPI. Excluding the World Economic Forum 
Executive Opinion Survey had the greatest effect.86 The sources that do not survey business elites 
instead rely on country experts.  
 
The use of business-oriented sources fluctuates over time. In 2001, for profit-consultancies 
accounted for 51.1 percent while another 46.1 percent came from civil society- and international 
organisation sources which were based on business surveys. Business-oriented sources were thus 
used almost all of the time for individual country assessments. They remained above 80 percent 
until 2006, close to or above 70 percent until 2011, above 60 percent until 2015, before falling to 
57.6 percent in 2016. Business-oriented sources used to overwhelmingly dominate the CPI. While 
their dominance in the ranking has declined, business concerns still shape the majority of individual 
country assessments.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of sources used for individual country assessment 2001-2016 
 
Source: Transparency International CPI methodological briefs, various years 
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The political economy of producing the CPI: TI workers as Grasmscian intellectuals 
 
Pope’s Sourcebook translated neoliberal rationality into a programme to govern corruption. By 
measuring corruption in accordance with this programme, the CPI became a technology of 
government. My findings suggest that the methodology is integral to the ‘governmental work’ that 
the CPI does. Loewenheim had argued that the CPI’s ‘responsibilisation’ of the state obscured the 
culpability of other actors in corruption.87 By focusing on corruption in the public administration, and 
relying primarily on business-oriented sources – both for-profit providers and business surveys – the 
methodology mirrors Pope’s neoliberal anti-corruption programme that sees business as the 
unwitting victim of state extortion. The methodology of the CPI is no incidental side-issue but is 
central to the act of translating the governmental programme into a technology and narrating a 
story of corruption shaped by business concerns. In order to understand how this corporate bias 
comes about, I will analyse the ‘translators’ of neoliberal rationality into programme – Pope and his 
Sourcebook – and from programme into technology – the TI workers who developed the CPI’s 
methodology. The analysis throws a light onto the ideological but also technical mechanisms by 
which these Gramscian intellectuals tell a corruption narrative amenable to corporate concerns. 
Empirically, I will draw on some of the secondary literature on the work of TI, especially the research 
of anthropologist Steven Sampson.88  
 
Gramscian IR proceeds in its analysis from social relations of production, to forms of state, and 
finally world orders. Intellectuals play a role in these attempts at forming a ‘historic bloc’ in which 
the world order articulates social relations of production. In the 1980s Cox and van der Pijl both 
noted that a transnational capitalist class had come into being.89 Gill found that the 1990s brought 
substantial changes to the global order: Transnational capital was not yet hegemonic but a ‘new 
constitutionalism’ was cementing a ‘disciplinary neoliberal project’ through global institutions such 
as the G7. ‘Market civilisation’ was normalised through extensive and often coercive methods of 
discipline and surveillance.90 Civil society is the terrain in which this new order is trying to establish 
hegemony: ‘Civil society is both shaper and shaped, an agent of stabilisation and reproduction, and a 
potential agent of transformation.’91  
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Intellectuals for Gramsci were not just those at the highest level of science and philosophy but also 
‘at the lowest the most humble “administrators” and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, 
accumulated intellectual wealth.’92 Or as Crehan puts it: ’those labouring in the vineyards of 
knowledge production.’93 The ‘organic intellectuals’ of transnational capital – those who provide 
coherence to what may become the foundation of its hegemonic project – are identified as 
technocrats in international financial institutions or private sector clubs such as the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), which, as shown above, provides a prominent input into the CPI.94 Others have 
expanded the field of organic intellectuals to include technocratic ‘functionaries’ and empirical cases 
include such varied examples as an East European regional development bank or Egyptian think 
tanks.95 Citing Cox, Shields finds that these economic functionaries in state and international 
organisations ‘perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies, 
and organizations which bind together the members of a class and of a historic bloc into a common 
identity.’96 The further the analysis move away from transnational corporations and the 
commanding heights of global economic governance – for instance the international financial 
institutions – the more difficult it becomes to identify the ‘organic’ class linkage between 
‘intellectuals’ in civil society and capital. Things become particularly interesting when we reach civil 
society organisations that embrace causes that may disrupt the workings of global capital – the fight 
against poverty, fair trade, anti-corruption – and who would deny any linkage to capital. The 
interesting puzzle that the CPI then throws up is how an anti-corruption NGO ended up promoting a 
corruption narrative that ultimately reflected the concerns of global corporations: How to reduce 
the risk of having to pay a bribe. How did capital end up ‘deputising’ an anti-corruption pressure 
group?  
 
 
The analysis in the previous section of this article on ‘how’ corporate bias entered the CPI provides a 
clue: The translation of a neoliberal rationality into a programme to govern corruption and the 
subsequent translation of this programme into the technology of ‘governing at a distance’ that is the 
CPI. TI workers produced a corruption narrative amenable to global corporations due to two main 
factors. The first is ideological affinity. The discussion of Jeremy Pope’s Sourcebook showed that the 
purpose of anti-corruption was a ‘clean’ capitalism and the way to this was to ‘responsibilise’ states 
– the belief in corruption as exception and putting the onus of ‘cleaning up’ capitalism on the state. 
However, there is also a second aspect which emerges during the act of translation of Pope’s 
programme into the technology that is the CPI: The political economy or producing the CPI, both in 
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terms of the monetary cost of compiling the CPI and the deployment of ‘scientific capital’ in the field 
of tension between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies.97 
 
 
The anthropologist Steven Sampson highlighted the competing moral and economic impulses driving 
TI’s work by variously charactising it as a ‘movement’ of ‘integrity warriors’ and a participant in the 
‘anti-corruption industry’.98 On the one hand TI derives its legitimacy from the moral indignation that 
corruption creates, on the other hand TI seeks to work with the powerful elites that perpetrate 
corruption – states, corporations – because they control access to both material and symbolic 
resources that allow TI to persist in the ‘industry’. Eagleton-Pierce highlights this dilemma: NGOs 
need to ‘speak the same language’ as those they seek to influence but risk being co-opted; or they 
can choose a radical path and risk not being listened to by the powerful elites which are the targets 
of advocacy.99 There is a tension between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies. Eagleton-Pierce notes 
that this leads to an activist subjectivity he characterises as those of ‘critical technicians’ who ‘mimic 
established experts’ in order to show off the ‘scientific capital’ that allows their advocacy to be 
heard. Note the importance of technical know-how, which might cover expertise such as the 
mastery of compiling a methodologically sophisticated global index. Critical technicians display a 
‘cautious temperament’ due to ‘pressure to conform’.100 Crucially, they also need to ‘appeal to 
alternative sources of authenticity, notably by reactivating the historical critique of capitalism as a 
system which undermines the realisation of social justice.’101  
 
 
This second impulse may explain why TI was keen to disavow the exorbitant influence that business-
oriented sources had on the CPI as well as the fluctuations in the NGO’s willingness to acknowledge 
a possible bias in this direction except at certain points in time and buried in the annexes, 
methodological notes, and FAQs that come with the CPI. Acknowledging the weight of corporate 
concerns in the making of the CPI would undermine the index’s credentials. TI derives its legitimacy 
from a fundamental critique of prevailing practices in the global economy – corruption – but it must 
also work with those who practice corruption in order to influence their behaviour. As Eagleton-
Pierce notes, expertise builds a bridge to policy circles and what better bridge than an index which 
tells a corruption narrative shaped primarily by the concerns of corporations. The tension between 
insider and outsider strategies, moral crusade and the moderation of expertise thus explains how TI 
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became the ‘deputy’ of capital, although whether this qualifies as an ‘organic’ connection to capital 
is open to debate. Eagleton-Pierce certainly does not think so. While he notes the affinity of the 
concept of ‘critical technicians’ with Gramscian organic intellectuals, especially the willingness to 
participate in the struggle for hegemony, he also argues that ‘in contrast to classical Gramscian 
analysis, the category [of critical technician] does not presume a class-bound foundation of self-
awareness’.102 The tension between insider and outsider strategies was playing out in TI’s internal 
deliberations about the CPI. One external evaluation of TI’s work noted that ‘The status of the CPI is 
regular source of debate at Annual Membership Meetings’ but that the organisation was holding on 
to it ‘because there is no single alternative with the same power to capture the attention both of 
journalists and decision-makers’.103 These internal discussions confirm Shields’ observation that the 
bodies of ‘functionaries’ who act as collective intellectuals are not bureaucratic monoliths but sites 
of ‘micro-disputes’.104  
 
 
Another aspect that shapes the CPI methodology is the economics of compiling it. Sampson had 
noted that the work of Transparency International is shaped by the budgetary constraints of modern 
NGO management.105 TI’s work is  embedded in a political economy of aid in which moral crusades 
are being ‘projectised’. TI needs to conduct projects funded by third parties to survive financially. 
Economic considerations of an NGO with a tight budget were also driving the production of the CPI. 
Compiling global rankings on corruption is expensive because it requires surveys of business elites or 
country experts. As Espeland and Stevens note: ‘Rigorous, defensible and enduring systems of 
quantification require expertise, discipline, coordination and many kinds of resources, including 
time, money, and political muscle.’106 The agencies which compile global corruption rankings are 
primarily very large international organisations such as the World Bank or private business 
information providers who sell their expertise to large corporations. Transparency International 
needs as many corruption rankings as possible to compile the CPI and most of them come from for-
profit providers. These are more likely to reflect what their corporate clients need to know about 
corruption.  
 
 
When TI first compiled the CPI in 1995, the small and relatively unknown NGO would not have had 
the resources to conduct global surveys of corruption perception and yet it became the first non-
18 
 
commercial provider of such a ranking. This is why it is important to take into account the history of 
how rankings are compiled because early methodological choices become baked in. Commercial 
providers had these resources, and they did compile the data. TI therefore obtained these 
commercial rankings and aggregated them into the CPI. A collection of reports that were designed to 
enable corporate elites to navigate potentially corrupt public administrations in ‘emerging markets’ 
was effectively rebranded as global civil society’s go-to anti-corruption tool. In the press release for 
the first CPI, then-chairman of TI Peter Eigen acknowledged that the index was based on polls of 
business interests and financial journalists and said: ‘It is thus a picture of how international business 
sees the levels of corruption.’107 By 1997 the press release accompanying the CPI was claiming that 
methodological changes meant that business sources were now being balanced by other sources.108 
Non-commercial alternatives have since proliferated, not least because the internet made it easier 
to gather data. TI’s methodological tweaks further reduced the share of business-oriented sources, 
for instance ending the triple- and then double counting of business surveys in 2012. These are the 
reasons why the share of sources produced for corporate clients, or based on business surveys, has 
fallen from 97.2 percent in 2001 to 57.6 percent in 2016. These sources still dominate the CPI but to 
a lesser extent than they used to. 
 
 
Once a governance index is produced, it needs to reach its consumer. The main avenue are the 
media. Broome and Quirk describe the competition of NGOs and international organisations (IOs) 
over ‘issue expertise’ in a ‘benchmarking market’:109  
‘The popularity of benchmarking as a strategic tool for producing authoritative expertise – or 
at least the public appearance of expertise – is most notable in relation to NGOs and some 
IOs, which frequently find themselves in competition with their peers for allies, attention, 
and resources.’  
The CPI is TI’s primary publicity instrument. Every year around the date when the CPI is published, 
google searches for the term ‘corruption’ skyrocket.110 The more countries the CPI covers, the more 
publicity it is likely to attract. In 2012 TI commissioned an assessment of its methodology. It 
recommended that TI include only countries in the CPI for which it can use at least six sources.111 
Currently the CPI requires only three sources. Using more sources per country would also potentially 
reduce the reliance on private sector-oriented sources. This would have cut the number of countries 
covered in the 2012 CPI from 174 to 58. Few global media outlets would have been interested in 
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such a small ranking. There are potential trade-offs between methodological rigour and media 
attention. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The CPI is a reformist benchmark. This article documented that surveys that reflect the corruption 
concerns of global corporations outnumbered sources that reflected other concerns in the making of 
the CPI. The novel contribution the article made was the interpretation of TI workers as Gramscian 
intellectuals. There was a degree of ideological affinity between those who formulated TI’s original 
anti-corruption strategy and corporate interests, namely the desire for a ‘clean’ capitalism expressed 
in Jeremy Pope’s Sourcebook. The other aspect that shaped TI workers’ role was the ‘markets’ they 
were facing. They can be understood as ‘critical technicians’ deploying ‘scientific capital’ and 
balancing this with the legitimacy of being ‘integrity warriors’. Another ‘market’ aspect of the index’s 
production was a cost calculation: A resource-poor NGO had to rely on commercial surveys that 
reflected the concerns of their paying customers – the risk of having to pay a bribe.  
 
The wider relevance for the analysis of the politics of global benchmarks is twofold. Firstly, 
methodology matters in Foucauldian analyses of ‘governing at a distance’. The way in which 
neoliberal rationality is being translated into a programme and then into a technology is political and 
contains tensions and contestations that shape the outcome. Secondly, these acts of translation are 
embedded in a wider global political economy, which can be understood by interpreting the workers 
who produce these benchmarks as Gramscian intellectuals. They may not be ‘organically’ linked to 
capital but as ‘critical technicians’ they remain close to the hegemonic ideology proposed by those 
closer to corporate interests. The political economy of governing at a distance developed in this 
article is a useful tool for understanding the politics of global benchmarks. 
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